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responsibility for the environment
Davide Vecchi
ORGANISMALITY GROUNDS SPECIES COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY:
Abstract
It is frequently claimed that our species is responsible for climate change, for a new 
impending mass extinction, for destabilising ecosystems dynamics etc. These claims 
might be interpreted literally as meaning that it is our species, not merely its constituent 
organisms, that is causing climate change, biodiversity loss and ecosystem upheaval. Such 
literal interpretation depends on what kind of answer is given to the general theoreti-
cal question concerning whether supra-organismal biological entities such as groups, 
populations and species can be morally responsible for anything as collectives. I shall 
argue that organismality is the biological property grounding species collective moral 
responsibility. The question is thus whether our species is organismal enough to make 
it a morally responsible causal agent.
1. Framing the issue: from political philosophy to biology
Virtually all ecosystems are affected by human-induced dynamics such as 
population growth, depletion of natural resources and global warming. It is 
therefore unsurprising that estimating the causal effect of our species’ activities 
on the biosphere is a major concern of a plethora of natural and applied sciences. 
In turn, causal analysis informs ethical debates concerning our species’ respon-
sibility towards the biosphere, other species and future human generations. But 
ascriptions of collective responsibility are controversial for a number of reasons1. 
After all, species can be seen as mere collections of individual organisms without 
unified collective moral agency, so that moral responsibility can ultimately be 
fully distributed between their constituent organisms, i.e., the only relevant 
1 Smiley 2017.
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causal agents. Thus, in order to make ascriptions of collective responsibility 
meaningful, we need to characterise the conditions that make a collection of 
individual organisms a unified collective causal agent and, as such, a putative 
moral agent. In this article I will mainly focus on the issue of causal agency. 
The literature in political philosophy has made a series of contributions in 
this sense, particularly concerning the characterization of the organisational 
features that a collective must possess in order to be more than the sum of its 
constituent individual organisms. Significantly, French2 distinguishes between 
aggregate and conglomerate collectives. While the first are collections of indi-
vidual organisms without significant social structure and whose behaviour is 
reducible to the additive behaviour of the individual organisms, the latter are 
organizations of individual organisms whose «…. identity is not exhausted by 
the conjunction of the identities of the persons in the organization»3. In par-
ticular, French emphasizes the existence of a set of enforced standards of conduct 
regulating the behaviour of the individual organisms of the conglomerate col-
lective, standards that are lacked by aggregate collectives4 . On a similar tone, 
Shockley argues that, in some circumstances, causal and moral responsibility 
cannot be fully distributed between the individual organisms of the collective 
because the latter exerts coordinating control on their behaviour5. While May 
argues that, when individual organisms share the same intention, the explanation 
should be couched, at least in some cases, in terms of the causal capacities of 
the group structure6; thus, “collective intentions” are irreducible to the inten-
tions of individual organisms. The unifying theme of all these contributions is 
that the collective exerts some kind of control or constraint on the behaviour 
of the individual organisms, which implies the rejection of strong forms of 
methodological individualism (an issue on which I shall return in Section 4). 
As it is frequent in science, metaphors and analogies are used in order to 
conceptualise the behaviour of hierarchically organised complex systems with 
many components. These figures of speech are frequently transferred between 
disciplines. Two important analogies for understanding coordinated behaviour, 
control and constraint have pervaded the literature in the life and social sciences. 
The first is the human agency analogy which, translated to the conceptualisa-
tion of the behaviour of collectives, would provide a way to understand them 
as subjects with causal and moral agency. The crucial epistemological ingredient 
of the analogy is the idea of centralised control, whereby a higher-level agent 
2 French 1984.
3 Ibidem: 13.
4 Ibidem: 14. 
5 Shockley 2007.
6 May 1987: 65.
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(e.g., a “homunculus”) controls the behaviour of the lower-level components. 
A long tradition of exceptionalist thinking, stretching from Aristotle through 
Descartes to Kant, posits that humans are unique in being able to represent past 
and future scenarios and take rational decisions. While reason is the epitome of 
centralised control, this analogy has frequently imbued the practice of the life 
sciences, from immunology (i.e., the self model of immunological tolerance) 
to neurophysiology:
Modern biologists have abandoned the separate substance idea, but many still cling 
to a materialist version of the same mistake, based on the idea that somewhere in the 
brain the self is to be found as some neuronal process7.
This model of centralised control is dictatorial: the homunculus is the emperor 
of the body not on a par with other body’s components. The question is thus 
whether a conceptual model of this kind can be used to understand collectives’ 
behaviour. Historically, many attempts to model social phenomena in terms 
of centralised control have been proposed. The frequent appeals in the Marxist 
tradition to the “collective consciousness” of the proletariat are emblematic in 
this sense8. But there is an alternative: the collective might exhibit the distributed 
control typical of collectives of cells, tissues and organs such as multicellular 
organisms. This has been called the body politic analogy:
On the same grounds that the sociologist affirms that a society is an organism, the 
biologist declares that an organism is a society9.
The basic idea of this analogy is that there is a structural similarity between 
the processes of coordination, control and constraint between cells, tissues and 
organs on the one hand and that of individual organisms embedded in social 
and political institutions on the other. This analogy makes the postulation of 
the homunculus unnecessary10.
My general aim in this article is to clarify how biology can inform bioethical 
debates concerning putative species moral responsibility. More specifically, my 
aim is to assess under what circumstances a collective of individual organisms 
such as our biological species can be considered a causal agent with putative 
moral responsibility by taking seriously the analogy with multicellular organisms. 
The thesis that will be proposed is that organismal causal agency is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for moral agency. In Section 2 I shall identify 
7 Noble 2008: 25. 
8 Levine, Sober, Wright 1992. 
9 Charles Otis Whitman, see Sapp 2003: 82.
10 Varela 1999, Noble 2008.
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organismality – a term introduced in the biological literature, as far as I know, 
by Pepper and Herron11 – as the key property grounding ascriptions of causal 
agency. In Section 3 I shall evaluate whether our species is sufficiently organismal 
to be a causal agent. In Section 4 I shall propose a way to understand our spe-
cies’ behaviour in order to make sense of its eventual moral responsibility as a 
collective, issue touched in Section 5. My argument is biologically-informed but 
nonetheless complementary to the analysis provided by political philosophers 
defending genuine collective responsibility.
2. Groundwork on collective causal agency
What is causal agency? Can non-biological entities be causal agents? Wind – a 
diffused entity – causes waves while the moon – a distinct entity – causes tides. 
Biological entities such as Dna sequences, ribosomes and proteins are somehow 
causes of the formation of, respectively, Rna transcripts, amino acids sequences 
and catalytic reactions. Even though ascriptions of causal agency of this kind 
are common in the biological literature12, we must distinguish between, on the 
one hand, the power of an entity to cause events and bring about changes and, 
on the other, a causally stronger notion of agency13. Being causes is not enough 
in order to be causal agents: wind, the moon, Dna sequences, ribosomes and 
proteins are causes, but they are not intuitively agents. What is agency then? 
One possible answer is the following: agents are entities displaying the two 
properties of self-interest and causal autonomy. The first property refers to the 
existence of an internal teleology. In particular, all organisms, from bacteria to 
humans, strive to make a living out of what they have. Less trivially, they strive 
to preserve their identity through time via the assimilation of environmental 
resources. This capacity of striving for a basic existential goal (i.e., survival) might 
be connected to the capacity of having a perspective from which to value the 
nature of the encounters with the environment, a subjective point of view, a 
primitive form of sentience14. Wind, the moon, proteins, ribosomes, genomes 
and also thermostats, robotic vacuum cleaners and other machines are incapable 
of doing this. The second property, i.e., causal autonomy, refers to the capacity 
of initiating causal chains and being an autonomous source of activity instead 
of a mere «… passive sufferer of the effects of external forces»15. The issue of 
causal autonomy is connected with the nature of free will and is complicated 
11 Pepper, Herron 2008.
12 Fox Keller 2002. 
13 Schlosser 2015. 
14 Weber, Varela 2002.
15 Barandiaran, Di Paolo, Rohde 2009: 370. 
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by the existence of incontrovertible introspective evidence of freedom. I suspect 
that if the kind of freedom we experience directly indeed exists at all instead of 
being delusional, it must be realised independently of possessing sophisticated 
representational capacities. In summary, I suggest that x is a causal agent if and 
only if x possesses self-interests and causal autonomy. As a consequence, I will 
henceforth assume that all unicellular and multicellular organisms are causal 
agents because they possess self-interests and causal autonomy. Of course, it 
remains an open question whether they are also moral agents. Again, I must 
stress that the focus of my analysis is on substantiating biologically the notion 
of causal agency for the reason that I will be arguing that causal agency is a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility16.
Are supra-organismal biological entities causal agents as well? I shall for 
the sake of simplicity only focus on species in the remainder; the reason is 
that this will not affect the applicability of my argument to sub-species supra-
organismal aggregates17. The reason is that the compositional complexity of the 
supra-organismal aggregate is not relevant for causal agency. What is relevant 
is rather the organisational complexity, functional integration or organismal-
ity of the supra-organismal aggregate18. In order to answer the question “are 
16 Causal agency ascription to biological entities and processes generates an important bio-
philosophical problem. In a recent book, Okasha (2018) unpacks this complex issue by dismissing 
various claims (e.g., that natural selection is a genuine agent). The most interesting argument 
Okasha defends is that only organisms have goals and, relatedly, that it is only organisms dis-
playing biologically realised “consistency of purpose” (e.g., absence of “antagonistic traits”) that 
can be genuinely treated as causal agents. This means that there is no genuine non-organismal 
agency. Despite its trait-oriented bias, Okasha’s analysis is broadly in line with theories of organ-
ismality as “unanimity of interest” such as that advocated by Queller, Strassmann (2009, 2016), 
even though such unanimity is between the component parts (often organisms themselves) of 
a biological entity rather than between their traits. Indeed, theories of organismality provide a 
much richer analytical framework for my purposes as they stress the fundamental point that 
some organismality measure can be applied across the biological spectrum, significantly to all 
supra-organismal biological entities rather than merely to paradigmatic organisms. Obviously, 
the issue of linking causal agency to moral responsibility remains beyond the reach of biological 
theories of organismality.
17 By aggregate I hereby simply mean a group of components constituting a collective, without 
assuming anything about the organisational nature of the collective. 
18 Whether an aggregate is composed of 2 or more organisms is irrelevant for my analysis in 
the following two senses. First, the demonstration that a supra-organismal aggregate composed 
of 2 organisms is a causal agent is a proof of principle that compositionally more complex supra-
organismal aggregates might in principle be causal agents. In this sense, the fact that unicellular 
eukaryotes composed of one host-cell and one endosymbiont are causal agents is a proof of 
principle that multicellular eukaryotes might be causal agents. Conversely, the demonstration that 
a supra-organismal aggregate composed of n organisms is a causal agent is a proof of principle 
that supra-organismal aggregates compositionally simpler might in principle be causal agents. 
The fact that a human or a big group of organisms (Sober, Wilson 1998) can be causal agents 
is a proof of principle that insects and smaller groups might be causal agents. In all these cases, 
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species causal agents?” I propose to start from a basic biological consideration. 
Multicellular organisms are collections of cells or supra-cellular aggregates, while 
species are collections of organisms or supra-organismal aggregates. However, 
while collections of cells such as multicellular organisms (e.g., humans) are the 
epitome of causal agents, collections of organisms such as species are intuitively 
not: the agency of a species seems to be entirely parasitic on the agency of its 
constituent organisms. Let us try to unpack the rationale of this intuition by 
taking a cursory look at the literature in environmental ethics. 
In a series of publications, Johnson has argued that species are causal agents19. 
The upshot of Johnson’s analysis is that, starting from the thesis that species are 
individuals, it is reasonable to infer that species are living entities independently 
of their constituent organisms and, then, to reasonably infer that species have 
self-interests irreducible to those of their constituent organisms, where such 
interests ground their agency and moral responsibility.
All the inferences of this argument are controversial. The thesis that species are 
individuals can be interpreted in two ways: as a biologically trivial mereological 
thesis according to which species are concrete particulars made up of parts or as 
the thesis that species are “organismal” in the sense of displaying organism-like 
properties such as a certain level of functional integration. Only in the second 
sense species are cohesive units of organisms analogous to the cohesive units of 
molecules or cells constituting unicellular and multicellular organisms respec-
tively20. Johnson seems to think about individuality not in purely mereological 
terms, otherwise, as Sandler and Crane correctly argue: «The mere fact that 
species belong to the ontological category of “concrete, particular, persisting 
things comprised of material parts” is clearly insufficient to ground morally 
considerable interests»21. Johnson’s analysis is also controversial because it seems 
unnecessary to consider species alive, as organisms are, in order to be causal 
agents. Again, I agree with Sandler and Crane22 when they note: «The fact that 
species are living (on a sufficiently liberal definition) is thus doing no real work 
toward establishing that they have interests. The real question is whether some-
thing as loosely aggregated in terms of cohesion and organisation as species can 
have interests»23. What could be a species’ self-interest? Johnson proposes that 
supra-organismal aggregates are organismal because of their organisational complexity, not because 
the number of organisms composing the aggregate exceeds a certain threshold.
19 Johnson 1991; 1992.
20 Casetta, Vecchi 2019. 
21 Sandler, Crane 2006. 
22 Ibidem: 72.
23 My disagreement with Johnson is not that I believe that there exist non-living things with 
self-interests. My point is that the question of whether species are alive independently of its 
component organisms is confused. I also consider the analogous question concerning whether 
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a species has self-interests characterisable in terms of self-maintenance (e.g., in 
persisting as the same species by maintaining a certain level of genetic diversity 
in order to be able to resist environmental fluctuations, by being adapted to its 
environment, by maximising the number of its constituent members). Similarly, 
Sandler and Crane24 suggest that longevity, population size and adaptability to 
evolutionary pressures are indicators of the capacity of a species to self-maintain 
and, thus, having something that can be called self-interest. I suggest that this 
way of framing the issue is unnecessarily anthropomorphic. To ask whether a 
species is alive, whether it possesses self-interests, whether it is a source of activ-
ity etc. are epistemically inaccessible questions25. I suggest that the relevant and 
epistemically accessible question that can be framed in scientifically amenable 
terms is rather whether the collective causal agency of a supra-organismal ag-
gregate can be purely accounted in terms of their components’ causal agency; 
that is, whether they function analogously to multicellular organisms. In brief, 
the question of putative self-interest can be framed in terms of organismality: 
in what sense do species exhibit causal capacities analogous to those exhibited 
by multicellular organisms? Let me unpack this point.
Consider Johnson’s proposal that species possess self-interest in maintaining 
genetic diversity. The problem of this view is that, first, genetic diversity is a purely 
additive property of the species because it is computable by knowing the genetic 
diversity of its constituent individual organisms. Most importantly, properties 
of this kind can hardly ground the causal agency of species for the reason that 
the existence of variation is not necessarily indicative of any self-maintaining 
or goal-directed behaviour of the species26. A more promising alternative is to 
show that there exist characteristic species’ behaviours over and above that of 
the multicellular organism is alive independently of its component cells equally confused: is the 
multicellular organism alive because the majority of its component cells are alive and organized 
in a particular fashion or because of additional reasons? These seem to me epistemically inac-
cessible questions.
24 Sandler, Crane 2006.
25 Epistemic inaccessibility in this sense reflects the confused nature of the question at issue. 
Epistemically inaccessible questions might, however, become amenable to scientific investiga-
tion when anthropomorphic biases are expunged and proper explication or conceptual analysis 
is provided.
26 The notion of genetic diversity implies the existence of a plurality of organisms with dif-
ferent genomes; in this sense, this is a species’ aggregative property, not a property of any single 
organism. Analogously, chemical diversity is a property of the group of rocks varying in chemical 
composition rather than of any single rock. However, as there is no reason to posit causal agency 
on the part of the group of rocks in order to account for chemical diversity, so there is no reason 
per se to posit the causal agency of the species in order to account for genetic diversity; in both 
cases, diversity could be just the outcome of processes that are not dependent on the collective 
behaviour of the group of rocks or organisms. I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting 
this point.
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the constituent individual organisms. For instance, Eldredge and Gould propose 
that the capacities of species to maintain genetic and phenotypic uniformity 
between their members through causal processes such as developmental and 
genetic homeostasis ground attributions of individuality (i.e., organismality) to 
species27. But I would argue that even developmental and genetic homeostases 
are processes that can be fully unpacked in terms of the causal interactions 
between the individual organisms of the species. For instance, the elimination 
of less fit hybrids and phenotypically “deviant” organisms caused by genetic 
homeostasis (i.e., stabilising selection) seems to be accountable in terms of lower 
reproductive success. In my opinion, a stronger form of organismality that is 
not straightforwardly reducible to the causal agency of individual organisms is 
needed, a form that parallels the organismality of multicellular organisms, whose 
behaviour is not reducible to the causal capacities of the constituent molecules 
or cells. An important critical contribution in this sense has been suggested by 
Cahen28, who argued that species (or ecosystems) do not possess independ-
ent self-interests because their constituent organisms are not like the cells of 
multicellular organisms, whose behaviour is subordinated to the organism’s goals. 
Following Cahen’s insight, what needs to be ascertained is whether – contrary 
to what Cahen claimed – there exist species-level mechanisms for the “subor-
dination” of organismal behaviour analogous to those intuitively at work in the 
case of multicellular organisms. I suggest that without evidence in favour of 
the existence of such mechanisms, any argument defending the causal agency 
of species is destined to remain weak. 
I hope the reader realises that this is the same problem treated in the politi-
cal philosophy literature in the attempt to ground collective responsibility via 
the ascriptions of some form of causal agency to the collective. As related in 
Section 1, the basic issue in the political philosophy literature is to distinguish 
the organisational features making a group of people a conglomerate rather 
than a mere aggregate collective, where in the former case the causal agency of 
the collective is irreducible to the causal capacities of its constituent individual 
organisms. It is in this sense that the resistance to methodological individual-
ism in the social sciences and the resistance to reductionism in the life sciences 
are instances of the same attempt to ground the independent causal agency 
of composite structures or organisations such as conglomerate collectives or 
multicellular organisms29. Thus, if my criticism of Johnson’s argument is con-
27 Eldredge, Gould 1972.
28 Cahen 1988.
29 This is not surprising because, after all, the explanation of aggregate behaviour is one of the 
central problems of both the life and social sciences. The body politic analogy illustrated in Section 
1 captures the same point: the problem of explaining how cells interact within a multicellular 
organism is structurally analogous to the problem of explaining how the individual organisms 
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vincing, instead of focusing on the vindication of anthropomorphically-based 
ascriptions of properties and causal capacities such as being alive and possessing 
self-interests, a more promising way to proceed to understand species’ putative 
causal agency is in terms of organismality. 
3. Species’ organismality
The theory of organismality is a theory of biological individuality studying 
the nature of the relationships between the components of a biological system 
rendering it a physiological and/or evolutionary unit exhibiting “unanimity of 
interest”30. This theory can be applied in principle to any aggregate biological 
system, including unicellular organisms, mono-species and multi-species aggre-
gates of unicellular organisms (e.g., biofilms, symbiotic associations), multicellular 
organisms, multi-organismal aggregates such as species up to ecosystems and 
the entire biosphere. What I aim to explore is whether also multi-organismal 
aggregates such as our species might exhibit sophisticated forms of organismality 
that justify collective causal agency ascriptions. Two basic points about theories 
of organismality should be highlighted. First, organismality is not a categorical 
but a continuous property; thus, the corollary is that some aggregates might be 
more organismal than others. Secondly, organismality is biologically instantiated 
in multiple ways via a variety of mechanisms. 
The gradualness of organismality can be misunderstood in three ways. The 
first is that there is no direct correlation between size and organismality. On 
the one hand, a smaller bacterium is more organismal than a mono-species 
biofilm. On the other, a bigger multicellular organism such as a human is more 
organismal than a microscopic multi-species biofilm. The reason, as we shall see 
below, is that bacteria and multicellular organisms possess more sophisticated 
mechanisms of control and subordination of components’ behaviour than bio-
films. A corollary is that small species localised in a very small patch of land are 
not necessarily more organismal than a species geographically dispersed for the 
reason, again, that organismality depends on the existence of mechanisms of 
control and subordination of species members’ behaviour31. The second way in 
which the gradualness of organismality might be misunderstood concerns the 
comparison between aggregates at the same level of the biological hierarchy: they 
in a society interact. All these phenomena can somehow be treated as social and, for this reason, 
amenable to be explained – as I shall show in Section 4 – via various methodological stances that 
can be categorised as atomism, methodological individualism and holism (Levine et al. 1992). 
30 Queller, Strassmann 2016. 
31 Mechanisms of control and subordination of species members’ behaviour intuitively work 
better at small spatial scales for most species. However, in the case of our species, this is not 
necessarily so. See below in the Section. 
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do not necessarily display the same degree of organismality. Some multicellular 
organisms, symbiotic associations and ecosystems might be more organismal 
than others. Organismality depends on the details of the evolutionary history of 
the biological system taken into consideration. The same point applies to spe-
cies: different species display different degrees of organismality and this depends 
on their evolutionary history. In this sense, our species has evolved a plethora 
of cultural means through which it can enhance the cooperation and reduce 
conflict between its constituent organisms that are lacked by other species, like 
pine trees or wild boars. Finally, a third misinterpretation of the gradualness of 
organismality is significantly advocated by the same proponents of the idea: in 
fact, Queller and Strassmann argue that species «are never organisms»32. Given 
the a-categorical nature of organismality, it trivially follows that the fact that 
a species is not sufficiently organismal at time t1 does not mean that it might 
eventually become sufficiently organismal at tn.
A taxonomy of the biological properties realising organismality has been pro-
vided by many authors33. Some of these properties (i.e., partner fidelity of the 
components of the aggregate or tendency to reproductive co-transmission)34 are 
irrelevant for our analysis as they are tailored to conceptualise the organismality 
of multi-species aggregates, a problem that eludes the central question of this 
article which specifically concerns the organismality of our species as a mono-
species supra-organismal aggregate, i.e., constituted merely of humans. Another 
property concerns the genetic homogeneity of the components of the aggregate: 
the more genetically homogeneous are the components of the aggregate, the 
more organismal the aggregate. The cells of a multicellular organism are, given 
their common origin from a single reproductive event of fertilization, gener-
ally genetically homogeneous (excluding, for instance, somatic mutations). Of 
course, many multicellular aggregates, despite being somehow organismal, are 
not so homogeneous (e.g., Portuguese Man of War or lichens). Other multi-
organismal aggregates (e.g., bee and ant colonies) are genetically homogeneous 
and for this reason are sometimes labelled “superorganisms”. The organisms of 
our species are not genetically homogeneous. Of course, our species might be 
characterised through statistical artefacts such as a reference genome, or might 
even be characterisable for some of its history in terms of a set of genomic prop-
erties, but the genomic uniformity of the constituent organisms of our species 
is never guaranteed and always open to change through evolutionary history. In 
this sense, our species is more like a genomically diverse multicellular organism. 
Note however that genetic homogeneity is implicitly a proxy for relative lack of 
competition and increased cooperation between components. It is therefore a 
32 Queller, Strassmann 2016: 859. 
33 Pepper, Herron 2008; Queller, Strassmann 2009 and 2016. 
34 Queller, Strassmann 2016. 
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measure of genomic adaptive beneficial cooperation. Let us now consider two 
properties realising organismality that are particularly relevant for evaluating 
our analogy between multicellular organisms and species.
a. Spatial proximity of the components: the more the components of the 
aggregate live spatially proximate, the more organismal is the aggregate. The 
macromolecular components of a bacterium are enclosed in a membrane and 
interact appropriately by sustaining the bacterium’s life. The cells of a multicel-
lular organism are also enclosed in a limited space and interact appropriately by 
sustaining the life of the multicellular aggregate. Species, on the other hand, do 
not possess clear boundaries like membranes or epidermis35. 
b. Adaptive beneficial cooperation between the components: the more the com-
ponents of the aggregate are involved in interactions of beneficial cooperation, the 
more organismal the aggregate. The cells of a multicellular organism are durable 
partners because they have evolved to benefit each other: cells relinquish some 
of their innate tendencies (e.g., proliferation) in order to benefit the aggregate. 
Cells interact in multifarious ways by regulating, constraining and sanctioning 
each other’s behaviour. They exhibit integrative (not merely response) cohesion36. 
Response cohesion is the capacity of components to behave in a coordinated 
manner to the same kind of environmental stimulus without significant causal 
interaction between them. The coordinated behaviour is just the result of the 
similar, though uncoordinated, responses of the individual components of the 
aggregate. Cellular responses are a chief example of integrative cohesion and 
coordinated behaviour; any environmental stimulus will result in an integrative 
and coordinated response: drastic temperature increases will induce production 
of heat shock proteins on the part of cells which will benefit the entire multicel-
lular organism; pollution and UV light exposure will induce up-regulation of 
the cellular mechanisms of Dna repair and the consequent reduction in somatic 
mutations that will equally benefit the entire multicellular organism etc. Cel-
lular differentiation is a particularly clear example of regulated, integrative and 
coordinated behaviour. Cells differentiate according to relational properties of 
the developmental context: if the same cells were put in contact with a different 
set of cells (e.g., in a different tissue), they would differentiate differently. This 
means that «A single cell isolated from either one of these tissues [....] fails to 
35 Note that spatial proximity does not seem to apply to our species and that this property 
is in tension with the first misunderstanding of the notion of organismality highlighted above 
(i.e., that small species localised in a very small patch of land are not necessarily more organismal 
than a geographically dispersed species). This tension will be solved below in the Section, when 
organismality criteria are applied to species.
36 Barker, Wilson 2010. 
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originate the tissues that would result from their reciprocal interactions»37. It 
is for this reason that cellular differentiation can only be explained by taking 
into account both the relational and intrinsic (e.g., genetic) properties of cells 
(making atomistic accounts of cellular behaviour hopeless, see Section 4). 
Multicellular organisms possess the two above properties in high degree. 
Most significantly, they possess a set of biologically realised “enforced standards 
of conduct” that, translated in a different social context, parallel what French 
(see Section 1) considers the set of mechanisms for regulating the behaviour of 
the individual organisms of conglomerate collectives38. Multicellular organisms 
also possess a set of mechanisms of subordination of cellular behaviour to the 
organism’s goals that Cahen (see Section 2) sees as the principal difference be-
tween them and multi-organismal aggregates like species39. These are all evolved 
mechanisms of adaptive beneficial cooperation, cooperation enhancement, 
reduction of conflict, reciprocal regulation, constraint and sanction of compo-
nents’ behaviour. I thus suggest that, of all the properties realising organismality, 
adaptive beneficial cooperation is the most important.
Let us now consider whether our species can be organismal in the above 
senses. Does the relative lack of spatial proximity prevent the possibility of 
suitable causal interactions? The geographical distribution of our species at the 
moment is striking: humans have managed to colonise almost every pocket of the 
planet. Our species has a complex metapopulation structure, with the members 
of several subpopulations interacting reproductively mostly between themselves.
However, spatial dispersion might not necessarily quell the appropriate in-
teraction making an aggregate organismal. For instance, globalisation through 
technology provides the means for reducing spatial dispersion: long-distance 
travels and social networks work on this very principle. So, even though it might 
be argued that the mechanisms of control and subordination of species mem-
bers’ behaviour intuitively work better at small spatial scales for most species, 
our species is peculiar. The point can be elucidated in a different way; compare 
the organismality of our species when it emerged in a localized African area 
as a very small and geographically isolated population thousands of years ago 
and the organismality of our species today; my point is that today, despite its 
astonishing geographical dispersion and demographic explosion, our species is 
more organismal, basically because of globalisation. More fundamentally, even 
though the huge number of extant organisms constituting our species are hugely 
dispersed and not genetically homogeneous, this does not impinge on the pos-
sibility that forms of adaptive beneficial cooperation emerge. This means that, 
37 Soto, Sonnenschein 2011: 333. 
38 French 1984. 
39 Cahen 1988. 
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despite lacking certain organismality properties, our species might nonetheless 
display a high level of organismality. In fact, it seems to me that our species is 
the most organismal. As a species, we have acquired, through biological and, 
especially, cultural evolution, mechanisms that parallel the evolved mechanisms 
of adaptive beneficial cooperation, cooperation enhancement, reduction of 
conflict, reciprocal regulation, constraint and sanction of cellular behaviour 
illustrated in the case of multicellular organisms. Humans are unlike pine trees 
and wild boars in possessing rich cultural mechanisms and social norms in 
order to realise significant forms of integrative cohesion. Again, I suggest that 
it is chiefly the existence of these mechanisms that might justify ascriptions of 
collective causal agency. 
4. Understanding collective causal agency 
In this Section I shall consider what kind of explanatory strategy should 
be used in order to understand collective causal agency. Again, I shall answer 
this question by using the analogy between multicellular organisms on the one 
hand and our species on the other. As it was anticipated at the end of Section 2, 
the behaviour of aggregates could be explained in reductionist (e.g., atomistic, 
methodologically individualist) and anti-reductionist (e.g., holistic) terms.
Starting with multicellular organisms, the history of developmental biol-
ogy is quite revealing about the constant battle between reductionist and 
anti-reductionist explanatory tendencies40. In Section 3 we already discounted 
atomistic accounts focusing solely on the intrinsic properties of cells as limited. 
An explanation of why a pluripotent cell becomes a nerve or liver cell cannot 
be couched, for instance, in purely genetic terms as if Dna were the sole de-
velopmental cause. Dna is expressed appropriately because the cell in which it 
is localised regulates its expression, where this regulation is in its turn causally 
affected by the complex processing of the molecular signals that the cell receives 
from its neighbouring cells, cells that in turn are part of relational structures 
such as specific tissues. To account for differentiation in purely genetic terms 
would be to discount the regulatory causal role of the cell as well as that of the 
relational context of the tissue. Dna in a hierarchically organised multicellular 
context actualises causal capacities because of such regulatory contexts. In a 
nutshell, a “cellularised” Dna molecule is not the same as an isolated Dna mol-
ecule. The problem does not fade away if a reductionist explanation considers 
as relevant causes entities belonging to different hierarchical levels such as Dna 
molecules and cells. Consider the process of cancer formation. A reductionist 
explanation might be couched in terms of the mutational capacities of the cell 
40 Vecchi, Hernández 2014. 
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that will eventually abandon the default state of quiescence and resume prolif-
eration, becoming cancerous. This explanation discounts as irrelevant the causal 
influence of supra-cellular structures such as tissues. But when cancerous cells 
are transplanted or injected in healthy tissues, their behaviour is “normalised”, 
reverting to a non-cancerous state41. One entity that seems causally efficacious 
in this case is the tissue that, through the causal influence of its architectural 
properties, regulates the cell’s behaviour. Again, a “tissueised” cell is a different 
causal agent from the isolated cell42. 
Let us now consider our species’ behaviour. Consider the following example. 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were used as refrigerating agents since the 1930s 
without knowledge of their potential risk on the ozone layer and, consequently, 
on the biosphere. After the risk was realized in 1970’s, it triggered a concerted 
response on the part of many local and global organisations finally resulting in 
their worldwide ban in 1992. One global organisation involved in the concerted 
response was the UNEP (i.e., United Nations Environmental Programme), which 
established in 1977 the Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer, leading 
the way by imposing obligations to limit greenhouse gas emissions. One less 
global but still transnational organisation, the European Union, implemented 
several mechanisms of constraint and sanction of individual organisms’ behav-
iour: “collectively irresponsible” people could either be prevented from buying 
CFC polluting fridges or they could be sanctioned. I am pretty sure everybody 
would agree that atomistic explanations are hopeless in this context too: there 
is no intrinsic causal capacity (e.g., law-abidance, environmentalist conscience) 
that makes individual organisms behave as they do. Thus, either a methodologi-
cal individualistic or a holistic explanation seems necessary. Consider the first 
case. Elster defines methodological individualism as the thesis that all social 
phenomena:
are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals  –  their properties, 
their goals, their beliefs, and their actions. To go from social institutions and aggregate 
patterns of behavior to individuals is the same kind of operation as going from cells 
to molecules»43.
According to Elster, the way to explain the pattern of behaviour of col-
lectively irresponsible individuals is through other individuals’ influence. 
41 Soto, Sonnenschein 2011: 338. 
42 My analysis implies that some form of holistic explanation should be favoured in many 
cases in biology. Nevertheless, this is not the place to unpack the complex debate concerning 
the nature of holistic explanation. Suffice to say that some form of control of the macro-level 
over the micro-level must occur that is not accountable merely in constitutive terms (Craver and 
Bechtel 2006), but rather in causal ones (Santos 2015). 
43 Elster 1985: 5. 
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Suppose that what needs explaining is my failure to buy a Cfc polluting but 
inexpensive fridge in Portugal: the methodologically individualistic explana-
tion would unpack the causal role of the Unep and European Union’s ban in 
terms of the series of interactions between the people who know about the 
ban and who implement it and who, in the final instance, prevent me from 
buying the fridge. After all, the methodological individualist argues, all social 
organisations are constituted of individual people. This kind of explanation 
is structurally analogous to explanations of cellular differentiation in genetic 
terms and of cancer formation in terms of the mutational capacities of cells. 
I have criticised such kinds of explanations above in this Section. For this 
reason, I find Elster’s quip that there is something fundamentally wrong in 
explaining molecular phenomena partially in terms of cellular behaviour as 
a relic of a bygone reductionist age. The alternative I propose is to resort to 
some form of holism. Holistic explanations posit the causal influence of “social 
structures”. Institutions like the Unep, the European Union etc. are, after all, 
not solely constituted of individual people, but of documents, laws, directives, 
initiatives etc.44. They also rely, for the implementation of their constraining 
and sanctioning mechanisms, on national institutions (i.e., Portugal) and 
other more local social structures (e.g., the Lisbon local authority). Further-
more, even though social structures are partially ontologically constituted of 
individual people (i.e., organisms), they are multiply realisable (for instance 
through continuously changeable executive and legislative bodies) by differ-
ent individual organisms. Most importantly, social structures causally affect 
the behaviour of individual people. In this sense, the holistic explanation is 
analogous to the explanation of cellular differentiation in terms of the regu-
latory causal role of the cellular and tissue relational contexts as well as to 
the holistic explanation of cancerous cell’s normalization illustrated above. 
In all these cases, what we see at work are enforced standards of conduct45, 
mechanisms of subordination46, policing systems47, mechanisms of sanction 
based on the imposition of rules constraining the behaviour of “collectively 
irresponsible” components (e.g., cancerous cells and people lured by pollut-
ing fridges). For all these reasons, I suggest that the causal capacities of such 
social structures cannot be unpacked purely in terms of the interactions of 
44 Ferraris 2009; Ferraris 2012. 
45 French 1984. 
46 Cahen 1988. 
47 Queller, Strassmann 2016. 
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the constituent individual organisms48. A “socialised” individual organism is 
a different causal agent from the isolated individual organism49. 
5. Making sense of species’ moral responsibility
I have so far defended the thesis that our species might be considered highly 
organismal because of the existence of a set of mechanisms of reciprocal regulation, 
constraint and sanction of individual organisms’ behaviour that is sufficiently 
analogous to those regulating developmental and physiological processes in 
multicellular organisms. I suggest that it is chiefly the existence of these mecha-
nisms that justifies ascriptions of collective causal agency to supra-organismal 
entities. While there is little doubt that our species is the most organismal, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to provide an articulate analysis concerning the 
origin, richness and nature of these mechanisms. This is, after all, the province 
of cultural evolution studies, human anthropology, economics, sociology and 
political theory. Only these sciences would be able to provide the necessary 
evidence in favour of the empirical hypothesis that the organismality of our 
species is high enough for causal agency ascriptions. Nonetheless, and despite 
the possible limitations that analogical reasoning might have, high organismality 
would ground ascriptions of causal agency to our species. Furthermore, given 
that organismal causal agency is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, 
the claim that our species – or, better, the human population at the moment – is 
morally responsible towards the biosphere and future human generations for 
causing climate change, biodiversity loss, ecosystem upheaval etc. is not without 
foundation. 
Moral responsibility ascription to the extant human population implies that 
responsibility cannot be fully reduced to that of individual members of our spe-
cies or to other social groups. And here lies the rub. The problem is that it is 
certainly the case that some sub-species social entities are more organismal than 
the entire human population, e.g., nation states, religious groups, lobbies, criminal 
gangs etc. There is no doubt that the distinction between local and global norms 
and mechanisms of regulation, constraint and sanction of individual organisms’ 
behaviour is crucial. Nobody would doubt that many local sub-species social 
entities regulate individual organisms’ behaviour by the establishment of a set of 
local norms and local mechanisms of social control. In the rather trivial example 
provided in Section 4, the global institution is the Unep, while EU, nation states 
48 See Levine, Sober, Wright 1992 and Schwartz 1993 for alternative but analogous criticisms 
of methodological individualism.
49 I thank Gil Santos for extensive discussions on this issue and for, as much as I know, coin-
ing the useful terminology of “cellularised” Dna molecules and “socialised” individual organism. 
However, the terrible expression “tissueised” cell, equally inspired, is my entire fault.
Rde75_interni.indb   67 25/11/20   16:39
68
and local authorities implement increasingly local norms and mechanisms of social 
control. The problem posed by this form of hierarchical and decentralised local 
control is that its existence allows apportioning causal and, henceforth, moral 
responsibility to local social actors rather than the entire species whenever the 
former are organismal enough. Unless global mechanisms of control constrain 
the behaviour of local social actors, possible competition and conflict between 
such local actors will ensue, with moral blame apportioned at the local level50. 
It is because of this fundamental theoretical problem that I propose to interpret 
the organismality thesis applied to our species in a cosmopolitan sense: only 
when the whole species, rather than some of its groups, is an organismal causal 
agent, we can make sense of its moral responsibility. Put differently, the extant 
human population can be morally responsible only when it can be considered as 
a global causal agent, that is, only when global norms and global mechanisms of 
social control of individual organisms’ behaviour exist51. But if the extant human 
population can be morally responsible only when it can be considered as a global 
causal agent, the analogy between multicellular organisms and our species might 
be seen as problematic. In a way, the form of globalism or cosmopolitanism I 
suggest seems to require an explanation in terms of centralised control modelled 
in analogy to human agency (see Section 1). However, I think that we need to 
resist this conclusion for the following reason. 
Analogies, despite being fruitful analytical tools, might lead us astray when the 
conceptualisation of the behaviour of hierarchically organised integrated systems 
is at stake. A multicellular organism is an integrated system made up of highly 
organismal cells and increasingly less organismal substructures such as tissues and 
organs. Humans are multicellular organisms with a highly evolved centralised 
nervous system. Nonetheless, they are still integrated systems made up of highly 
organismal cells and increasingly less organismal substructures such as tissues and 
organs. Indeed, the centralised nervous system is one very important substructure. 
The cells and substructures of multicellular organisms are analogous to the local 
social norms in the case of our species; they also behave analogously, reciprocally 
regulating, constraining and sanctioning the behaviour of other components and 
substructures of the integrated system. This nested hierarchy of components be-
haves in a distributed fashion without centralised control. The only way to make 
biological sense of the notion of centralised control at the heart of the human 
agency analogy is by postulating a peculiar kind of dictatorial control on the part 
of the centralised central nervous system, which would be seen as determining the 
50 I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this critical point.
51 The point is that, for instance, if the World Health Organisation could enforce the imple-
mentation of specific health policies on a global level (e.g., following South Korea’s policy of 
mass testing in the Covid-19 pandemic case) and curtail the application of national policies in 
contravention with its dictates (like those of Sweden in the Covid-19 pandemic case), the extant 
human population would be more organismal.
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entire behaviour of the multicellular organism by itself, effectively as a homuncu-
lus. But this postulation is highly disputable in biology, not only for the reasons 
anticipated in Section 152, but also because theoretical analysis of the behaviour 
of complex systems shows that decentralised control enhances their integration53, 
making the human agency analogy out-dated. If our species is highly organismal, 
it should exhibit the kind of decentralised control typical of distributed and inte-
grated complex systems like multicellular organisms. The cosmopolitan or globalist 
interpretation I propose does not require centralised and dictatorial control, but 
rather the nested type of distributed and reciprocal control of integrated complex 
systems where local and global structures causally affect each other. Accordingly, 
the extant human population can be seen as a global causal agent only insofar as 
global norms and global mechanisms of social control causally affect the behaviour 
of local social actors and individual organisms. It is only for this type of causal 
influence that the global causal agent is morally responsible. 
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